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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: CAN WHISTLE BLOWERS
REACH STATE AND LOCAL TAX DOLLARS?

JOHN R. HELLOW*
STACIE K. NERONI**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing use of the False Claims Act (“FCA” or “Act”)1 by both
whistle blowers and federal officials extracts hundreds of millions of dollars
from health care providers owned by states and local governments.2 In most
instances, these cases cost health care providers many times what they
collected through Medicare and Medicaid billings.3 These “recoveries” can

* John Hellow is a partner at the law firm of Hooper, Lundy & Bookman and has a Masters in
health care administration. He has been representing health care clients in government payment
disputes since 1982. Additionally, Mr. Hellow has represented clients in some of the largest civil
and criminal fraud investigations in the industry’s history.
** Stacie Neroni is an associate at the law firm of Hooper, Lundy & Bookman. She has been
assisting health care providers to resolve various legal difficulties including Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement and other regulatory and compliance issues.
Both authors would like to thank Julie Schollenberger, who is an associate at Hooper,
Lundy & Bookman for her generous and invaluable comments on the early drafts of this article.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
2. The anecdotal evidence suggests that some institutions now forego Federal payments
from Medicare, Medicaid and Civil Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services
(“CHAMPUS”) for some health services because the complexity of billing and documentation
requirements pose a significant risk of exposure to extreme liability under the FCA.
3. During a recent initiative, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania contacted a majority of Pennsylvania hospitals concerning alleged improper
Medicare billings of outpatient hospital services provided within seventy-two hours of an
admission. The government contended that such outpatient services were not separately billable
because of the subsequent inpatient stay. One small Pennsylvania hospital was advised that if it
chose to litigate the alleged false claims violation, it could be liable for almost $5 million in
damage multiples and penalties, but that it could avoid such devastating consequences by paying
multiple damages in the amount of $50,000. While this is an extreme example of the initiative,
ultimately over 4,600 hospitals were the target of that effort and fines and penalties, if calculated
under the FCA, in many instances were in excess of ten times actual damages. See, e.g., Jeff
McGaw, Hospitals Bemoan the Use of False Claims Act, PATRIOT NEWS-HARRISBURG, Oct. 4,
1998 at D03, available in 1998 WL 6481692; Jack Sherzer, Crackdown on Hospital Overbilling
is City-based: Feds Here Orchestrate $130 Million Effort, PATRIOT NEWS-HARRISBURG, Dec. 8,
133
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seriously jeopardize the funding of state and local government programs.4 The
Circuits have split on two questions critical to the enforcement of the False
Claims Act against state government entities: 1) whether states are “persons”
subject to liability under the Federal False Claims Act; and 2) whether a qui
tam relator, or “whistle blower,” is barred from suing a state by the Eleventh
Amendment.5 The Supreme Court is set to decide these questions this term in
United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources.6
Because even the statutory construction is colored by constitutional concerns
of sovereign immunity, states should be comforted by the fact that their
liability under the FCA will be decided by the same Court that decided Alden
v. Maine,7 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,8 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank.9 This Article examines the considerations the
Court should address in deciding whether Congress intended the FCA to
extend liability to the states and, if so, whether suits maintained by a qui tam
relator, without government intervention, violate Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity concerns.
Shortly before oral argument in Stevens, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion
in United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital.10 In Riley, the
Fifth Circuit held that a relator action under the FCA violated the Take Care
Clause of Article II of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine.11
Additionally, the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that “qui tam actions
in which the government does not intervene are constitutionally acceptable as
valid delegations of executive authority.”12 The majority explained that “there
is no real delegation of executive authority in such cases. Congress cannot be

1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 5712712; Pa. Hospitals Overbilling for Medicare, YORK
DAILY REC., Jan. 13, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 4892385.
4. For example, a recent government audit into allegations that teaching hospitals were
submitting false Medicare billing statements for services provided by teaching physicians resulted
in hefty settlements. The University of Pennsylvania settled with the government for $30 million,
but did not admit any wrongdoing, Thomas Jefferson University settled for $12 million, the
University of Virginia settled for $8.6 million, and the University of Pittsburgh settled for $17
million. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-98-174, MEDICARE: CONCERNS
WITH PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) AUDITS (1998) 2.
5. The Eleventh Amendment bans the commencement or prosecution of an action by a
private party against a state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also discussion infra Part VI.
6. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vt. Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d
195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
7. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
8. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
9. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
10. 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc review pending).
11. Id. at 531.
12. Id. at 530.
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delegating to relators the President’s power and duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed, for Congress may not delegate purely executive power
without the acquiescence of the executive.”13 Finally, the court declined to
decide whether relators could demonstrate Article III standing.
The
declination to review standing was premised on the Fifth Circuit’s recent
decision in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech University,14 where the
court assumed Article III justiciability for relator actions, thereafter binding
other panels of the Fifth Circuit on that issue until considered en banc or
decided by the Supreme Court. In light of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Riley,
the Supreme Court in Stevens took the unprecedented step of requesting
additional briefing on the Article III standing issue, due one day after oral
argument, on November 30, 1999.15 However, the Fifth Circuit in Riley will
be addressing both the Article III standing and Article II separation of powers
issues en banc, unless the Supreme Court addresses the standing issue first in
Stevens. The Court may feel compelled to at least address the Article III
standing issue in light of its decision in Calderon v. Ashmus,16 wherein the
Court held that Article III justiciability must be addressed before Eleventh
Amendment issues.17
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT EFFORTS TO INSULATE STATES FROM
PRIVATE LITIGATION
The import of state sovereignty in our constitutional system was reaffirmed
in 1999 by the Court’s decisions in Alden, College Savings, and Florida
Prepaid. In Alden, the Court made clear that Congress cannot abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity from suit by private parties brought in either
federal or state court without the state’s consent, unless attempting to remedy
or prevent constitutional violations.18 Noting that “[t]here are isolated
statements in some of our cases suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment is
inapplicable in state court,” the Court either explained away such statements as
dicta, or characterized a state’s participation in the subject matter of a Federal
cause of action as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the state.19 After a
review of the “history, practice, precedent and the structure of the
13. Id.
14. 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999). See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
15. See False Claims Act: High Court Hears Argument on Right of Qui Tam Whistleblowers
to Sue States, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) at 1874 (Dec. 2, 1999).
16. 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
17. Id. at 745 n.2. Because the Article II issues addressed in Riley are akin to the
Constitutional Conventions’ concerns with Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, those
issues will be noted in the discussion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see infra Part VI.
Article III standing issues are addressed in Part VIII.
18. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
19. See 119 S. Ct. at 2257-60.
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Constitution,”20 the Court found no “‘compelling evidence’ that this derogation
of the States’ sovereignty is ‘inherent in the constitutional compact.’”21
In College Savings, the Court considered whether Congress, through the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (“TRCA”), could create a private right of
action for false or misleading advertising and specifically impose liability on
the states.22 The private party argued (1) that the State had damaged its
property rights through false and misleading advertising in support of the
State’s own product in the prepaid tuition market,23 and (2) that the State
constructively waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in such marketing
efforts knowing that its conduct was subject to suit under the TRCA.24 The
Court held there is no constitutionally protected property right to fair
competition within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment that provides a
linchpin for Congress to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit.25 The majority also adopted an approach precluding constructive
waivers of state sovereign immunity by Congress except in situations where
the waiver is a condition of a federal grant or gift:
In any event, we think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the
State’s sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically
passed—and the voluntariness of the waiver destroyed—when what is attached
to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful
activity.26

Accordingly, the Court “drop[ped] the other shoe” and expressly overruled the
“constructive waiver” doctrine applied in Parden v. Terminal Railway of
Alabama Docks Department.27
The Florida Prepaid Court considered whether the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”), which
extended liability to the states for patent infringement, could be sustained as
20. Id. at 2266.
21. Id. at 2260 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)).
22. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, see 106 Stat. 3567, subjects states to suits
brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
23. College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
24. Id. at 2227-28.
25. Id. at 2225.
26. Id. at 2231.
27. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Parden involved Alabama citizens bringing a Federal Employers’
Liability Act (“FELA”) claim against an Alabama owned railroad. The Court observed that “a
State’s operation of a railroad in interstate commerce” subjected it to suit because allowing
employees the ability to sue under FELA but not to extend that right to employees of State owned
railroads left the employees without “any effective means of enforcing that liability.”
Accordingly, the Court was “unwilling to conclude that Congress intended so pointless and
frustrating a result.” Id. at 190. The College Savings Court found that “Parden stands as an
anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of
constitutional law.” College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
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legislation enacted to enforce the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause.28 The plaintiff in Florida Prepaid was a patentee who
alleged that the State damaged the patentee’s property rights through patent
infringement.29 The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”30 and also grants Congress the right to abrogate
state sovereign immunity, through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
giving Congress “the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”31 Accordingly, the Court
addressed whether the Patent Remedy Act could be justified as appropriate
enforcement legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The
Court concluded that Congress had not examined whether adequate remedies
existed under state law to remedy patent infringement violations by the state;
therefore, the Patent Remedy Act could not be characterized as appropriate
under Section 5.33
This limited review of the 1999 Court’s jurisprudence on states’ sovereign
immunity evidences an expansionist view of the states’ immunity from suit.
The outcome of Stevens, however, may signal whether the Court is reaching
the limits of the sovereign immunity doctrine or still exploring its boundaries.
III. A SYNOPSIS OF THE QUESTIONS THAT THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
ADDRESS IN STEVENS
Whether a state, local government, municipality, or one of their agencies
(“government entities”), is liable under the FCA for submitting false claims to
the federal government requires resolution of several issues. The False Claims
Act provides that “any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . is liable
to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and
not more than $10,000 per false claim” plus two to three times the
government’s actual damages and attorneys’ fees.34 The FCA authorizes
private persons to bring qui tam suits for violations of the Act.35 Several issues

28. 119 S. Ct. at 2199. See also Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-296 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997).
29. Id. at 2203.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
32. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
33. 119 S. Ct. at 2209. The Court found that because the Patent Remedy Act swept too
broadly, it subjected states to “expansive liability” without limiting its coverage to cases with
arguable constitutional violations “such as where a State refuses to offer any State-court remedy
for patent owners whose patents it had infringed.” Id. at 2210.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
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are unique to the application of the FCA to government entities. The first such
issue that must be addressed is whether Congress intended the term “person” to
include other government entities. General rules of statutory construction are
complicated by the requirement that Congress be “unmistakably clear” in its
intention that new legislative burdens will be imposed on states, when doing so
would disturb the “constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government.”36 This is sometimes referred to as the Clear or Plain Statement
Rule.37
Second, even if the Court decides that government entities are “persons”
under the FCA (thus raising the possibility that these entities are subject to
liability under the Act), the Eleventh Amendment may still bar suit against
some government defendants. While the Eleventh Amendment presents no bar
to suits commenced or prosecuted by the federal government,38 a qui tam
relator is merely a private plaintiff who has been authorized by statute to sue
for injuries sustained by the federal government. The Eleventh Amendment
bars suits commenced or prosecuted against states by private plaintiffs in both
federal and state courts.39 The Supreme Court believes that “the States’
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain
today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.”40 Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether
the qui tam relator sues for his or her own interests or stands in the shoes of the
United States government, the real party in interest.
While the Eleventh Amendment shields states and the arms of state
government from suit by private plaintiffs, lesser government entities such as
counties and cities may not be entitled to assert that jurisdictional bar. This is
not an issue in Stevens, but some lower courts have developed a common law
concept protecting these other government entities from punitive damages,
fines and penalties. The current trend, however, does not favor that concept.

36. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
37. The Court noted that the Plain Statement Rule “is nothing more than an
acknowledgement that that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Id. at 461. For purposes of
uniformity, this Article will refer to the rule as the “Plain Statement Rule.”
38. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128 (1965); West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987).
39. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (barring suits brought in
federal court) and Alden v. Main, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (barring suits brought in state court).
“In light of the history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the
States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.” Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
40. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47.
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How the Court will handle this decision may profoundly impact these
government entities when they enter the health care industry.
Finally, and an issue common to any FCA suit initiated by a qui tam
relator, is whether Article III standing is satisfied when a private party, who
has suffered no personal injury in fact, seeks to redress a public wrong. While
the relator receives a bounty in a successful suit, he does not receive damages.
Damages are the property of the federal government in such suits.
IV. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A.

The Act of 1863

One year prior to the original enactment of the FCA, a House Committee
published a report which, in discussing various frauds committed during the
Civil War, referred to certain state officials that had used war contracts for
their personal advantage.41 The report specifically stated that these examples
of fraud were not committed against the United States government.42 This
1862 report, however, is a rather tenuous link to the Act Congress passed one
year later.
The False Claims Act originated in a statute entitled “An Act to prevent
and punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States.”43 The Act was
adopted in 1863 and signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln as a
measure to combat rampant fraud perpetrated by military contractors during
the Civil War.44 The original Act distinguished between fraudulent acts
committed by “any person in the land or naval forces of the United States”45
and “any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States.”46
States or political subdivisions thereof would clearly not have fallen within the
first category, but ostensibly could fall within the second classification. The
Act was later codified as part of Title 31 of the United States Code in 1943,47
and recodified in 1982.48 However, the main portions of the Act had not been

41. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. and Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 876
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 2, 37th Cong., at xxxviii-xxxix (2d Sess. 1862)).
42. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2, 37th Cong., at xxxviii).
43. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (amended and codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3929-3733 (1994)).
44. See SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5273; see
also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (statement by Senator Howard) (noting that
“[t]he country . . . has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in
obtaining pay from the Government during the present [Civil War]”).
45. See § 1, 12 Stat. at 696.
46. See § 3, 12 Stat. at 698.
47. See 31 U.S.C. § 232 (Supp. V 1945).
48. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 11-12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 527677. The FCA is currently codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
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amended in any substantial respect until the False Claims Amendments Act of
1986 (“Amendments Act”) was adopted.49
B.

The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986

The Amendments Act was intended to modernize the FCA “to enhance the
Government’s ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against
[it] . . . in Federal programs and procurement.”50 The legislative history of the
Amendments Act noted that the False Claims Act targeted all those who
submitted false claims to the federal government and specifically used “[t]he
term ‘person’ . . . to include partnerships, associations and corporations . . . as
well as State and political subdivisions thereof.”51
Only three changes in the Amendments Act relate to whether states or
political subdivisions are included in the definition of “person” when
determining who may be sued under the Act. First, Congress changed those
who could be held liable under the Act from “[a] person not a member of an
armed force of the United States,” to simply “[a]ny person.”52 Congress made
this change because at the time the FCA was first enacted in 1863, the
government had more severe military remedies at its disposal than in 1986.53
In 1986, the government could not seek monetary recovery from members of
the armed forces and had to rely on less effective common law remedies. The
legislative history does not indicate that this change was intended to broaden
the class of persons who could be held liable under the FCA, except to include
members of the armed forces.54
Second, the Amendments Act increased the FCA’s civil remedies from two
to three times the amount of damages sustained by the government, and
increased the penalties from $2,000 per claim to a range of $5,000 to $10,000
per claim.55 A Congressional Budget Office report, included as part of the
Amendments Act’s legislative history, noted the proposed increased penalties
and damages under the Amendments Act, but concluded that the increases
49. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.
50. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
51. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273-74. This
Senate Report cites three cases as authority sufficiently analogous to the proposition that the term
“person” includes states and political subdivisions: Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); Georgia v. Evens, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360
(1934). See id. None of those decisions, however, concerned liability under the FCA.
52. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 206; S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.
53. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.
Under the FCA, as it was originally enacted in 1863, members of the armed forces who violated
the FCA could be court-martialed, fined, and/or imprisoned. See 12 Stat. at 697.
54. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 206-07.
55. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5282; 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1986).
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would “involve no significant costs to the federal government or to state or
local governments.”56
Third, the Amendments Act authorized the Department of Justice to issue
Civil Investigative Demands (“CID”) for documents or testimony in a False
Claims Act investigation.57 Under the CID provisions, “the term ‘false claims
law investigation’ means any inquiry conducted . . . for the purposes of
ascertaining whether any person is engaged in any violation of a false claims
law.”58 Further, the provision defines “the term ‘person’ [to] include any State
or political subdivision of a State.”59
V. DID CONGRESS INTEND FOR THE FCA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY ON
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AS “PERSONS” IN EITHER 1863 OR 1986?
A.

Does the Term “Person” as Used in the FCA Include States and the Arms
of State Government?

As already noted, the FCA imposes civil liability on any “person” who
makes a false monetary claim to the United States government, but
unfortunately does not define the term “person.” To determine whether this
language creates a cause of action against states and their subdivisions, it is
therefore necessary to ascertain whether Congress intended an expansive or
narrow reading of the term “person.” A narrow reading of the term should not
subject state government entities to suit or liability—either by a qui tam relator
or the federal government.
1.

A Survey Of Recent Decisions

The courts are divided on the issue of whether states are “persons” under
the FCA. In 1998, both the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Stevens v.
State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,60 and the Eighth Circuit in
United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of University of Minnesota,61 held that
states are “persons” subject to liability under the Act. In that same year, while
the Second Circuit decision in Stevens was still pending, the Southern District
of New York, in United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York,62 held that
states are not “persons” for purposes of liability under the Act. In 1999, the
56. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5302 (letter
from Rudolph G. Panner, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Senator Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, June 12, 1986).
57. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 33 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5298; 31 U.S.C.
§ 3733(a)(1) (1986).
58. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(s)(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 3733(s)(4) (1986).
60. 162 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 1998).
61. 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1998).
62. 8 F. Supp.2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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D.C. Circuit in United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business and Technical
Institute, Inc.63 similarly held that states are not “persons” under the Act.
In Stevens, a Vermont agency appealed a district court’s order denying its
motion to dismiss a FCA qui tam action.64 The private plaintiff alleged that the
agency, which received federal funds to pay for salary expenses incurred in
connection with certain federal grants, submitted false claims to the United
States government by instructing its employees working on the grant projects
to complete timesheets matching previously calculated estimates, regardless of
the amount of time actually worked.65 The Vermont agency argued that the
case should be dismissed because a state agency was not a “person” under the
Act.66 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the agency’s
motion, holding that a state is a “person” within the meaning of the Act.67 In
reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that states bring suits as plaintiffs
under the Act, which uses the same term “person” to describe both those who
may be sued and those who may sue; thus, since a state is a “person” for
purposes of suing under the Act, it is also a “person” subject to liability under
the Act.68
Although the Second Circuit considered the application of the Plain
Statement Rule to the term “person” under the FCA, it refused to apply that
rule. As understood by the Second Circuit, the Plain Statement Rule provides
“that if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”69 The court concluded
that the Plain Statement Rule applies only when the statute being interpreted
alters the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government
and does not apply to “legislation that does not interfere with traditional State
authority.”70 Since the Act prohibits acquisition of federal funds through fraud
and “[t]he States have no right or authority, traditional or otherwise, to engage
in such conduct,”71 the court reasoned that the Act did not interfere with
traditional state authority and therefore found the Plain Statement Rule was
inapplicable.72
63. 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
64. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 198.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 199.
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id. at 205.
69. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 242).
70. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 204.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 203-04. See also Zissler, 154 F.3d 870 (holding that a false claims action against a
state does not fall outside the usual constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government).
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In holding that states could be sued by qui tam relators under the Act, the
Stevens court also rejected the argument that such suits are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that even when the United States
government does not intervene in a qui tam action: (1) it retains the ability to
impose substantial control over the action; (2) it receives the largest portion of
any recovery; (3) it is the federal government’s injury which provides the
measure for damages; and (4) it is the federal government’s name in which the
suit is brought.73 Therefore, the court held, the United States government
remains the real party in interest, and suit is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.74
In Zissler, an employee brought a qui tam action, in which the United
States intervened, against a State university claiming the university made false
and incomplete statements regarding federal research grants.75 The district
court dismissed the action, holding that the State, and therefore the Stateowned university, was not a “person” for purposes of liability under the FCA
because the statute did not contain clear language indicating congressional
intent that states be included in the definition of “person.”76 However, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.77 The appeals court
reasoned that the Plain Statement Rule only applies to instances where the
statute alters the constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government; however, the court concluded that imposition of liability under
the Act does not alter that balance.78
Contrary to Stevens and Zissler, the Southern District of New York
decision in Graber and the D.C. Circuit in Long found that a state is not a
“person” under the False Claims Act. The plaintiff in Graber accused New
York and New York City, as well as various agencies, of falsifying compliance
information in order to receive federal funding and reimbursement for foster
care expenditures.79 The district court dismissed the claims by holding that
states and their municipalities are not “persons” under the FCA because
“neither the text of the [Act] nor the legislative history demonstrates that
Congress has ever actively considered whether to subject states and local
governments to False Claims Act liability, [much less that Congress clearly
and] unequivocally decided to do so.”80 The court also relied on the doctrine
of municipal immunity from punitive or exemplary damages and argued that
73. Id. at 202.
74. Id. at 203.
75. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871 (explaining the case history prior to appeal). The United
States chose to intervene in the action. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 873-75.
78. Id. at 874-75.
79. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 345.
80. Id. at 355.
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the treble damages and penalties authorized by the Act were punitive in nature
and, therefore, could not be imposed upon a state or municipality.81 Although
Graber supports the position that states are not persons under the Act, it was
impliedly overturned by the Second Circuit decision in Stevens.82 Graber is
also undermined by the fact that it relied heavily on the lower court’s decision
in Zissler, which was expressly overruled by the Eighth Circuit.83
The remaining case holding that states are not “persons” under the liability
section of the FCA is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Long. The qui tam relator
in Long was an employee of a State school auditing company.84 The relator
claimed that during an audit he discovered that the SCS Business and
Technical Institute had made false claims to receive federal funding for
students attending its school.85 He also alleged that his State employer was
aware of these false claims and conspired with the institute to conceal the
fraud.86 The D.C. Circuit court noted that the conventional reading of the word
“person” in the FCA does not include states, and observed that there was no
affirmative showing by Congress that it intended to include states within the
meaning of the word “person.”87 Accordingly, the court concluded that states
could not be held liable under the Act.88 The court asserted that the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Stevens, which categorized the state function at issue as
merely the filing of fraudulent claims, was too narrow an interpretation.89 The
D.C. Circuit applied the Plain Statement Rule and held that, even if states were
liable under the Act, the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity would bar the
qui tam suit brought by the private plaintiff, who, the court noted, was a real
party in interest along with the United States.90
2.

The Application Of Traditional Tools Of Statutory Construction

Courts construe the meaning of a statutory term such as “person” either by
reviewing the term’s plain meaning and the Act’s legislative history and
purpose, or by examining the definition and interpretation of the term in other
congressional acts. One court has even posited that a definition may be

81. Id. at 348-49. See also discussion under municipal liability in Part V.B.
82. The Second Circuit in Stevens did not expressly overrule the lower Graber court because
that decision was issued immediately before Graber was published.
83. See generally Zissler, 154 F.3d 870.
84. Long, 173 F.3d at 872.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 874.
88. Id. at 889-90.
89. Long, 173 F.3d at 887.
90. Id. at 889-90.
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inferred from how other entities, such as the states themselves, have interpreted
the term.91
Arguments against including states within the meaning of the term
“person” for purposes of the Act usually focus on the plain meaning of the
term “person.” For example, the Graber court asserted that “[t]he Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that ‘in common usage, the term ‘person’ does not
include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily
construed to exclude it.’”92 Ruling that the plain meaning of the term “person”
does not include states, the court further explained that the “literal text of the
statute, in short, does not plainly subject states and municipalities to False
Claims Act liability.”93 However, even courts holding that the plain meaning
or common usage of the word “person” does not include states or their
agencies have subsequently gone on to review the legislative history and
purpose of the Act in an effort to ascertain congressional intent. Even when
the common usage of the term “person” does not include states, the Supreme
Court has noted:
[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion” of the sovereign . . . and our
conventional reading of “person” may therefore be disregarded if “[t]he
purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, [or] the
executive interpretation of the statute . . . indicate an intent, by the use of the
term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law.94

While it has been argued that the legislative history supports the position that
Congress intended states to be included among those liable for False Claims
Act violations, both Graber and Long, relying on the Plain Statement Rule,
posit that this legislative evidence was not strong enough on its own to subject
states to liability under the Act when Congress had not clearly and expressly
stated its intent to do so.
As already noted, the legislative history accompanying the Amendments
Act indicated that the term “person” should be “used in its broadest sense to
include partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as States and
political subdivisions thereof[,]”95 and stated that the Amendments Act was
intended to increase the government’s ability to recover losses and make the
Act “a more useful tool against fraud in modern times.”96 The Zissler court
noted that “modern times” have brought about a significant increase in federal

91. See Stevens, 119 S. Ct. at 204.
92. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)).
93. Id. at 352.
94. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500
U.S. 72, 83 (1991) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941)).
95. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
96. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.
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grants to both state and local governments.97 Since the Act was enacted to
prevent fraud that would result in a financial loss to the United States
government,98 the court reasoned that it would seem illogical for Congress to
have amended the Act in an effort to increase its usefulness while at the same
time restricting its applicability by foreclosing qui tam actions against those
entities that receive such a large proportion of the federal funds granted.99
The Graber court argued that the Amendments Act’s legislative history
“should be accorded little, if any, weight in the interpretation of [the FCA]”
because it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Act as it stood before
being amended in 1986.100 The court explained that the Amendments Act
itself did not manifest an intent to hold states liable, but rather the legislative
history simply misconstrued the law as it stood at the time as holding states
liable as “persons” under the Act. 101 Additionally, the Congressional Budget
Office report included in the legislative history indicates that while damages
and penalties were being increased through the Amendments Act, no
“significant” additional costs were being imposed on the state or local
governments.102 The Graber court concluded that this evidence strongly
suggests that Congress as a whole did not contemplate that state and local
governments would be liable under the FCA.103
Both Stevens and Zissler compared the FCA’s liability provision’s use of
the term “person” to its use in the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand
provision,104 which defines “person” to include “any State or political
subdivision of a State,” thereby authorizing discovery demands on states.105
However, the Graber court argued that since “the very language of the [Civil
Investigation Demand] provision, . . . plainly states that the definitions
contained in [the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand provision] apply ‘[f]or
purposes of this section,’” the definition of “person” does not apply to other
sections of the FCA.106 The Zissler court found Graber’s point was not a
strong enough argument “to carry the day in the context of all the other
97. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 874.
98. See id. (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)).
99. See id.
100. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 353.
101. Id. at 353-54.
102. Id. at 354. See also SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N
5266, 5302.
103. Id. at 354-55.
104. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 875; Stevens, 162 F.3d at 207. See also supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text. Codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (1994), the Civil Investigation Demand
provision is based upon a similar provision available to the Department of Justice under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. See SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 33 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5298.
105. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(l)(4) (1994).
106. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3733(l) (1994)).
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considerations.”107 Zissler found little point in Graber’s argument that it
“makes perfect sense” for the Civil Investigation Demand provisions to apply
to states as “persons” because those provisions apply not only to “targets” of
investigations, but also to any “non-target” third parties who may have
information relevant to an investigation.108 Obviously, the Graber court found,
it is far less burdensome to allow discovery from a state than to allow suit
against a state.
In holding that a state is a “person” subject to liability under the Act, the
Second Circuit in Stevens observed that the Act uses the same term “person” to
refer to those who can be sued as well as those who can sue under its
provisions.109 The Second Circuit found support for its holding in cases where
states “brought suits under the Act as qui tam plaintiffs, clearly indicating that
they viewed themselves as ‘person[s]’ within the meaning of [the FCA qui tam
provision].”110
3.

The Plain Statement Rule

The Supreme Court has styled the Plain Statement Rule as an “ordinary
rule of statutory construction [which provides] that if Congress intends to alter
the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’”111 Although Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police112 and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon113 were cases involving the
issue of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court noted
that the concept has been applied in other contexts.114 For example, “Congress
must make its intention ‘clear and manifest’ if it intends to pre-empt the

107. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 875.
108. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 355 (citing H. REP. NO. 94-1343, at 2 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2596, 2597).
109. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 204 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730).
110. Id. (citing, for example, United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc.,
797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986), United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.
1984), United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1992)).
While analyzing the issue using the FCA provisions, the Stevens court ignores the entirely
different considerations involved in whether states are plaintiffs or defendants under the Act. As
plaintiffs, states can vindicate the same concerns as other plaintiffs under the FCA. As
defendants, however, a substantial portion of state tax revenues are diverted to a private
individual, the whistle blower, and the state’s status as a sovereign is denigrated. It is, moreover,
irrelevant to the issue of congressional intent that some states construed the term “person” to
allow them to initiate suit under a different section of the FCA.
111. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
112. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
113. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
114. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
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historic powers of the States” or if it desires “to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys” to the states.115 In United States v. Bass, the Supreme
Court indicated that in traditionally sensitive areas, legislation affecting the
balance between the federal government and the states requires a “clear
statement” to ensure that Congress has in fact faced, and intends to bring into
issue, the critical matters involved in that relationship.116
In the case of the FCA, both prongs of the Plain Statement Rule are
brought to bear. If by enacting the FCA, Congress is creating a private right of
action against the states, then Eleventh Amendment issues arise, and it is quite
evident that Congress did not clearly indicate that it intended the FCA to
impose liability on the states. On the other hand, if the Eleventh Amendment
is not implicated, then the Plain Statement Rule should still apply under
Pennhurst and Bass, because conditions on the grant of federal monies impose
new burdens on states, and this treads on the sensitive relationship between
state and federal governments.
Both the D.C. Circuit in Long and the Southern District of New York in
Graber agreed that the Plain Statement Rule applied.117 The Graber court
found that the punitive nature of the treble damages and penalties altered the
traditional balance between the states, municipalities and the federal
government.118 In Long, the D.C. Circuit found the linchpin for application of
the Plain Statement Rule in Will. Therein, the Court found the Plain Statement
Rule “particularly applicable” in cases where “it is claimed that Congress has
subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before.”119
However, in Zissler, the court took the stance that subjecting states to
punitive damages and penalties under the FCA did not disrupt the balance of
power revered by the courts in Graber or Long. The Zissler court stated:
Nor does the application of the False Claims Act to States constitute coercion,
thereby disrupting the usual balance of power between the United States and
the States. There is no coercion in subjecting States to the same conditions for
federal funding as other grantees: States may avoid these requirements simply
by declining to apply for and to accept these funds. But if they take the King’s
schilling, they take it cum onere.120

While the Zissler court may have correctly stated the facts as applied in the
context of federal grant programs, its reasoning does not apply to the majority

115. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1987)).
116. 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
117. Long, 173 F.3d at 874, 887-89; Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d 355-56.
118. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d 355-56.
119. Long, 173 F.3d at 874 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 64).
120. 154 F.3d at 873 (emphasis added).
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of false claims actions filed in the federal health care context.121 Most such
cases involve federal reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid programs
for services provided. These are not grant programs, but rather reimbursement
programs for services provided to federal or state/federal program
beneficiaries.122 Federal health care reimbursement is the type of commercial
activity that the Court in College Savings found beyond the pale of permissible
coercion because prohibiting the funding would not be denying a “gift or
gratuity” under Congress’ Spending Clause power, but rather would be
excluding a state from otherwise lawful activity.123
Because the FCA is not tailored to a specific program or activity, perhaps
application of the Plain Statement Rule should not be dependent on the facts of
particular cases, for presumably congressional intent would be uniform as to
the application of the FCA to any frederal program. Accordingly, if the statute
reaches any state conduct that would be protected by application of the Plain
Statement Rule, and it is evident that Congress did not consider the impact on
states, then that should determine whether states are “persons” under the Act.
It is reasonably clear in the case of the FCA that Congress failed to
consider those important questions. For example, the Congressional Budget
Office report included in the legislative history of the Amendments Act noted
that the proposed amendments increased penalties and damages under the Act,
but still concluded that the Amendments Act would “involve no significant
costs to the federal government or to State or local governments.”124 Given
that budget impact statement and the FCA’s lack of clear language of
congressional intent to affect the rights of states, application of the Plain
Statement Rule favors avoiding state liability under the FCA.
B.

Does the Term “Person” in the FCA include Counties and
Municipalities?

The courts are also divided on the question of whether counties and
municipalities (“local governments) are “persons” under the FCA. In 1999, an
Illinois federal court in United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Institute for

121. The Supreme Court has generally applied the permissible coercion analysis as part of its
Eleventh Amendment analysis, rather than as a part of the Plain Statement Rule. In Will,
however, the Court noted that the two considerations are similar. See generally Will, 491 U.S. 58.
The Zissler court also did not have the advantage of the Court’s analysis in College Savings
concerning the substantial limitations that the Court placed on the types of coercion Congress
could impose on states to abrogate their sovereign immunity, although in the context of federal
grants it appears the court would agree with Zissler.
122. For a concise educational review of Medicare and Medicaid, see generally BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 838-83 (3d ed. 1997 &
Supp. 1999).
123. See College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2231.
124. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 37, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5302.
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Medical Research125 held that a county is a “person” for purposes of liability
under the Act. In Chandler, a qui tam relator brought an action against the
Hektoen Institute (“Institute”) and the county, alleging that the Institute
misrepresented the progress of a study funded by federal grants.126 The relator
also alleged that the Institute was noncompliant with the federal regulations
governing the research project and the grant of funds therefor.127 In holding
that counties are “persons” under the Act, the court relied on both the
legislative history of the Act, in particular the previously mentioned 1986
Senate Report and the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand provisions, and other
court decisions holding states were “persons” under the Act.128 This case was
later appealed and the decision affirmed.129
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of California in
LeVine v. Weis130 held that a county is a “person” under California’s False
Claims Act.131 In LeVine, a fired teacher who complained about his
classrooms being unlawfully understaffed brought a wrongful termination
action against a county school district.132 The court held that California’s False
Claims Act applied to governmental entities, including the county.133 The
court reasoned that the California legislature enacted the false claims act to
protect the public fisc, and in light of that purpose “[t]here is no reason to
conclude the Legislature intended that the protection afforded to the public
treasury by [California’s False Claims Act] be denied merely because the
entity raiding the treasury is a governmental entity.”134 While this case was
concerned only with California’s False Claims Act, the same argument is
relevant to the Federal False Claims Act.
Contrary to the holdings in Chandler and LeVine, the Graber court, in
keeping with its position that the term “person” does not include states, held
that the term also does not include municipalities.135 In reaching its decision,
the Graber court argued that while “municipalities typically are presumed to
be persons at common law,” the presumption falls when punitive or exemplary
damages may be imposed.136 The court noted that the common law doctrine of
municipal immunity from exemplary or punitive damages was “well

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

35 F. Supp.2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
Id. at 1079-80.
Id.
Id. at 1083-84.
The Supreme Court recently denied the case certiorari. See 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999).
68 Cal. App. 4th 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
See CALIF. GOV’T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
LeVine, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 760-63.
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 765.
Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 354.
Id. at 348-49.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT

151

recognized when the False Claims Act was first enacted in 1863”137 as
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1981:
It was generally understood by 1871 that a municipality, like a private
corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to suit for a wide
range of tortious activity, but this understanding did not extend to the award of
punitive or exemplary damages. Indeed, the courts that had considered the
issue prior to 1871 were virtually unanimous in denying such [punitive]
damages against a municipal corporation.138

The reasoning behind prohibiting exemplary or punitive awards against
municipalities for their wrongdoing is set forth in some detail by the Court in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. The Fact Concerts rationale rests on
the notion that forcing the municipality to pay awards of this nature would
burden the very same taxpayers for whose benefit the suit had been brought,
and would not enhance the deterrent effect on the governmental bad actor.139
This reasoning holds true irrespective of whether the plaintiff is a private
party or the federal government. Therefore, whether the term “person”
includes municipalities may depend on whether courts find the mandatory
penalties and treble damages authorized by the Act to be punitive or remedial.
If the authorized damages are considered punitive, and the term “person” is
read to include municipalities, the result would create a cause of action against
an entity that could never be utilized due to the common law doctrine barring
punitive damages against municipalities. The logical solution would be to
allow suits against municipalities under the Act but allow only actual damages
to be imposed. However, since the FCA expressly provides that if liability is
established the courts must award at least double damages and a fine of at least
$5000 per claim,140 the court would have to re-write the Act—an action
obviously beyond the power of the courts.
The courts have not given a definitive answer as to whether the FCA and
the damages which it imposes are punitive or remedial. Prior to the
Amendments Act, the FCA provided for double damages and, in a qui tam suit,
awarded the relator one half of those damages.141 In finding that the double
damages provision was remedial in nature, the Supreme Court argued that “it
can not be said that there is any recovery in excess of actual loss for the
government, since in the nature of the qui tam action the government’s half of
the double damages is the amount of actual damages proved.”142 However,
with the addition of the Amendments Act in 1986, the FCA currently provides

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 348.
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1981).
Id. at 266-71 (1981).
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a) (1994).
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. at 698.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943).
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for recovery of treble damages, plus penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000
per false claim.143 The Graber court concluded that these treble damages
under the FCA were punitive “because they are not limited to, but rather
substantially exceed, the actual damages suffered by the United States.”144
In contrast to the district court decision in Graber, the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Brekke145 held that treble damages are not punitive.146 The
United States government accused the Brekke defendants of submitting false
real estate loan applications to the Small Business Administration.147 The
Small Business Administration brought a civil suit against the defendants to
recover its losses; however, it reached a settlement agreement with the
defendants.148 The government brought a subsequent and separate criminal
action under the FCA.149 The defendants argued that their earlier settlement of
the civil action barred any subsequent criminal prosecutions, a position with
which the district court agreed.150 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that a
civil action under the Act is not punitive and, therefore, does not bar a
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct.151 The court held that
the purpose of the Act was to help the government become whole through
recovery of losses incurred.152 Quoting the Supreme Court in United States v.
Halper,153 the Eighth Circuit argued that even a multiple recovery is
compensatory, “unless the amount sought by the government ‘bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss.’”154 The
court further noted that the Halper court acknowledged that “in the ordinary
case fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages . . . [did] no more than make the
Government whole[]” because the damage to the Government includes costs
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine, in addition to the actual
losses resulting from a false claim.155 The Brekke court similarly categorized
the FCA’s treble damages.156

143. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The relator receives between twenty-five to thirty percent of these
damages if the government chooses not to intervene. See id. § 3730 (d)(2).
144. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 349.
145. 97 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 1996).
146. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 349. See also Chandler, 35 F. Supp.2d at 1086 (finding “the
[Act’s] treble damages provision is more compensatory than punitive”).
147. See Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1046.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1046.
151. Id. at 1048-49.
152. Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1048-49.
153. 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (analyzing the remedial/punitive distinction for double
jeopardy purposes), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
154. Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 449).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1048.
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The Supreme Court in Halper, however, went on to find that the excessive
damages imposed on this particular defendant for violations of the FCA were
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.157 Therefore, it follows from
Halper that if double damages can be considered punishment for double
jeopardy purposes, they may also be considered punitive, thereby lending
support to the argument that municipalities are not “persons” under the Act.
Halper, however, was distinguished by the district court in United States v.
Peters.158 The Peters court noted that Halper involved a defendant who
submitted sixty-five separate Medicare false claims; thus, the defendant was
liable for sixty-five separate penalties amounting to two hundred and thirty
times the actual damages suffered by the government.159 Thus, the Court in
Halper concluded that the damages incurred by the defendant were “so
extreme and so divorced” as to inflict punishment rather than merely
compensating the government for its losses.160 In Peters, however, even after
trebling the government’s losses and deducting the investigative expenses, the
defendant was liable for only twice the government’s actual proven
damages.161 The Peters court concluded that, unlike the damages in Halper,
the treble damages borne by the defendant in Peters were rationally related to
compensating the government for its losses.162
The reasoning of the courts indicates that the issue of whether the FCA’s
treble damages and authorized penalties are punitive versus remedial remains
open. The trend seems to favor finding local governments liable under the
FCA. The Supreme Court has declined review of the one case that has reached
the Courts of Appeals;163 consequently, inconsistent treatment will likely
continue until another Court of Appeals’ decision creates a split among the
Circuits to prompt certiorari.
VI. DOES THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BAR SUIT?
In Hans v. Louisiana,164 the Supreme Court held that states are immune
from suit by individuals based on the Eleventh Amendment and the inherent
nature of sovereignty.165 The Eleventh Amendment provides that states are
immune from suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
927 F. Supp. 363 (D. Neb. 1996).
Id. at 369-70; see also Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 446-47.
See Peters, 927 F. Supp. at 369-70.
Id.
See Cook County, Ill. v. Chandler, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999).
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 18-19.
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by Citizens of another State.”166 In Alden, the Court explained the basis for the
states’ retention of sovereign immunity from private suits:
A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the
United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” . . . differs in kind from the suit of
an individual: While the Constitution contemplates suits among the members
of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures, the fear of
private suits against nonconsenting States was the central reason given by the
founders who chose to preserve the States’ sovereign immunity. Suits brought
by the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for
each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad
delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.167

Thus, the issue appears to involve whether a suit brought or prosecuted by
a private person against a state under the FCA, partially and perhaps primarily
to benefit the federal government, fits within the safeguards that prompted
states to consent to suits against them by the federal government as part of the
Constitutional Convention. The resolution of this issue requires some review
of the involvement of the relator in a whistle blower action, especially when
the government does not intervene. The FCA provides that “[a] person may
bring a civil action for a [FCA] violation . . . for the person and for the United
States Government.”168 The statute clearly states, therefore, that the private
person brings the action in part, on his or her own behalf. The government has
limited time to choose to intervene in the action.169 If the government
intervenes, it is responsible for conduct of the action, but the private person
remains a party to the action.170 If the government does not intervene, the
private party is responsible for the conduct of the action.171
According to the Alden majority, the founding fathers clearly contemplated
that a suit on behalf of the federal government would be both “commenced and
prosecuted” by those who can “exercise the political responsibility for each
suit prosecuted.”172 All suits brought under the FCA’s qui tam provision are
commenced by citizens and, if the federal government does not intervene, they
are prosecuted by citizens. Accordingly, no person entrusted with Alden’s
“exercise of political responsibilities” is involved with the commencement or
prosecution of the suits. Unless Congress has authority to delegate federal
power to commence suits against states to private citizens, FCA suits would
not appear to survive constitutional muster under the Eleventh Amendment.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (emphasis added).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A), (c)(1) (1994).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
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As evident from this analysis, the issue may turn on whether courts find
that the federal government, not the relator, is the real party in interest. While
one court has held that the qui tam relator is the real party in interest,173 the
weight of authority is that the United States government is the real party in
interest, even when the government does not intervene.
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech
University174 avoided the question of whether a state is a “person” by first
deciding the jurisdictional issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a
qui tam action brought against a state or state agency.175 In Foulds, a medical
resident brought a qui tam action against a State university alleging that “staff
physicians routinely signed patient charts and Medicare/Medicaid billing forms
certifying that the services were personally performed by the staff physicians
or by the staff physicians’ employees under their personal direction,” even
though the services had actually been performed by medical residents with no
supervision.176 First, the court assumed “person” included states.177 The court
then held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the private plaintiff, who is the
real party in interest, from bringing a qui tam suit against a state; therefore, the
court lacked authority to decide whether the FCA created a cause of action
against the states by including states within the meaning of “person.”178
The D.C. Circuit court in Long took the opposite approach from Foulds
because, not only did the State fail to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity as
a defense, but it also specifically requested that the court decide the statutory
question first.179 The court initially decided that a state was not a “person”
within the meaning of the FCA, thereby avoiding “the serious constitutional
question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars qui tam suits against the
State in Federal court.”180 In a supplemental opinion, the concurrence argued
that “the Eleventh Amendment bar on suits against the states in Federal court is
not a garden variety jurisdictional issue” because states can waive immunity,
giving federal courts the power to hear a case.181
The Second Circuit in Stevens held that the federal government is the real
party in interest in a qui tam suit under the Act, even when it chooses not to
intervene. The Stevens court noted:

173. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
174. 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
175. See id. at 281.
176. Foulds, 171 F.3d at 282.
177. Id. at 288.
178. Id. at 294.
179. See Long, 173 F.3d at 892. (supplemental decision) (Silbermann, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 889-90.
181. Id. at 892. “[W]here a court lacks power only if a state claims that it does, it is arguable
that [the court has] no obligation to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue first if the state does
not demand that [it] do so.” Id. at 893.
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In light of the fact that qui tam claims are designed to remedy only wrongs
done to the United States, and in light of the substantial control that the
government is entitled to exercise over such suits, we conclude that such a suit
is in essence a suit by the United States and hence is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.182

The Stevens court, however, ignored the fact the FCA expressly provides that
the suit is also brought on behalf of the individual, who is therefore a party to
the suit who has complete control over the conduct of the suit if the federal
government chooses not to intervene.
The same conclusion was reached by the district court in United States v.
Rockwell International Corp.183 The qui tam relators in Rockwell brought an
action against the defendants for allegedly fraudulently charging the federal
government for the costs associated with unauthorized production of personal
items that were not covered under a federal defense contract.184 The
defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against
them.185 The court disagreed, finding that the United States’ decision not to
intervene “does not change the suit’s character.” 186 Finding the United States
to be the real party in interest, the court concluded that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is not an available defense. 187
In United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson
Cancer Center,188 the Fourth Circuit similarly found the United States to be the
real party in interest in FCA actions.189 The qui tam relator in Milam brought
suit against a State university for submitting false research data to obtain
federal grant monies.190 The university argued that it was immune from suit
under Eleventh Amendment, and moved for dismissal.191 The district court
denied the motion. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the primary issue as
“whether the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought by
the United States extends to actions brought on the United States’ behalf by qui
tam relators.”192 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the
university’s motion and ruled that the United States remains the real party in
182. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 203; see also United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154
F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex., 961 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1992);
Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100 (2nd Cir. 1990).
183. 730 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Co. 1990).
184. Id. at 1032-33.
185. Id. at 1033.
186. Id. at 1035.
187. Id.
188. 961 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1992).
189. Milam, 961 F.2d at 48 (citing Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104).
190. Id. at 47-48.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 47.
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interest, even when it chooses not to intervene.193 Accordingly, the court
found the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable to qui tam actions.194
In United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp.,195 the Seventh
Circuit added itself to the growing list of courts finding that the United States
is the real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions. The defendant in Hall
argued that the relator did not have standing to bring the suit because the
relator had not suffered an injury-in-fact.196 The court found “challenges to the
standing of the government’s representative [to be] beside the point” because a
qui tam relator sues on behalf of the United States.197 Thus, the court focused
on the “the only [remaining] issue . . . [of] whether the United States, as the
real plaintiff, has suffered a sufficient injury for purposes of [standing under]
Article III.”198 The Milam court similarly noted that the government’s injury,
and not the relator’s injury, confers standing; thus, it “could not lightly
conclude that the party upon whose standing the justiciability of the case
depends is not the real party in interest.”199
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas200
held that a qui tam action brought under the Act is a suit by the United States;
therefore, the state may not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.201 In
Rodgers, the qui tam relators alleged that the State and its department of
education falsely stated they were in compliance with the federal civil rights
laws in order to obtain federal education funding.202 The court explained that
even though the United States declined to intervene, “the structure of the qui
tam procedure, the extensive benefit flowing to the government from any
recovery, and the extensive power the government has to control the litigation”
supported the conclusion that the United States remains the real party in
interest.203 Moreover, the court pointed out that FCA provisions allowing qui
tam relators to bring suit further the FCA’s purpose of preventing frauds on the
federal government and increase the likelihood of recovery for losses.204
193. Id. at 50.
194. Milam, 961 F.2d at 50.
195. 49 F.3d 1208 (7th Cir. 1994).
196. Id. at 1211.
197. Id. at 1213.
198. Id. at 1214.
199. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49.
200. United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
201. See id. at 866.
202. Id. at 867.
203. Id. at 868 (quoting Milam, 961 F.2d 46, at 49 (4th Cir. 1992)). See also Searcy v. Philips
Elec. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp.,
49 F.3d 1208 (7th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715
(9th Cir. 1994); Minnotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. Long v.
SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 999 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1998).
204. Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 868.
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Accordingly, the court held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions “do not alter the
underlying character of the action as one for the aggrieved party as defined by
the statute,”205 and that the aggrieved party is the federal government.206 The
Ninth Circuit in United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp.,207 similarly
relied upon the Milam decision in agreeing that “[q]ui tam relators cannot and
do not sue for [False Claims Act] violations on their own behalf . . . [but
r]ather sue on behalf of the government as agents of the government, which is
always the real party in interest.”208
Courts have relied on four major factors in coming to the decision that the
United States is the real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions:
1.

The federal government receives the majority of all monies
recovered;

2.

The FCA governs false claims submitted solely to the federal
government;

3.

The federal government has significant rights of control over a qui
tam action even if it does not intervene; and

4.

Private individuals can only sue in the name of the federal
government.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear to support the courts’
conclusion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) commands that “[e]very
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,”209 and the
Act requires qui tam actions “be brought in the name of the [federal
g]overnment.”210 For these provisions to remain consistent, the United States
must be the real party in interest. But because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure also state that the “real party in interest” is anyone authorized by
substantive law to sue,211 and the FCA authorizes the qui tam relator to sue, it
may also be argued that Rule 17(a) supports the position that the qui tam
relator is the real party in interest.
The district court in United States ex rel. Moore v. University of
Michigan212 took an interesting approach to this issue. The court held that the
United States is the real party in interest in actions brought under the FCA
provision authorizing qui tam actions in the name of the federal government,213

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
91 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1218 n.8 (citing Killingsworth, 25 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1994)).
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
860 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT

159

but that the private qui tam relator is the real party in interest in actions brought
under the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision authorizing suits involving unlawful
retaliatory employee terminations.214 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
state and state agencies were entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity
in wrongful termination suits brought by qui tam relators, but were not entitled
to such a defense in false claim actions brought by qui tam relators.215
As the above decisions indicate, it is apparent that the majority of courts to
address the issue have held that the government is the real party in interest in a
qui tam action. However, not every court subscribes to that view.
Unfortunately, none of these decisions focus on the underlying purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereign immunity that were so prominent
in the Court’s analysis in Alden, and will likely be of concern to the Court in
Stevens.
Those issues were clearly a concern of the Fifth Circuit in Foulds.216 The
Foulds court found that “even though the United States may be a relevant
‘party’ in this suit for some purposes of the litigation, the Federal Government
certainly is not the acting party-of-record in this suit.”217 The court concluded
that since the federal government chose not to intervene, the relator who
brought the qui tam action was the party who had commenced and prosecuted
the action.218 Thus, the federal government was held to be merely a passive
beneficiary and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.219
Although the Long court avoided the Eleventh Amendment issue by holding
that states are not “persons” under the FCA, in dicta it argued that both the
United States and the private plaintiff are real parties in interest because the
FCA authorizes private persons to bring suit both for the federal government
and for themselves.220 Since “the Eleventh Amendment must be satisfied for
every claim in the suit,” the court stated that it seriously doubted the Eleventh
Amendment would permit the qui tam relator’s claim against the state.221
Even if the United States is held to be the real party in interest in a qui tam
action, the Eleventh Amendment issues are not fully resolved. There remains
the issue of whether allowing suits by qui tam relators against the states
involves an improper delegation of the federal government’s power to sue a

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994).
Moore, 860 F. Supp. at 404-05.
See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
Foulds, 171 F.3d at 291.
Id.
Id. at 294.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
Long, 173 F.3d at 884-86 (emphasis added).
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state.222 Suits brought by the federal government against states are brought by
those under a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. A private
plaintiff has no such duty and, therefore, may abuse the power to sue. The
D.C. Circuit in Long argued that allowing the federal government to delegate
its Eleventh Amendment exemption to private plaintiffs creates an “all too
easy . . . option” around the constraints on Congress’ power to abrogate states’
immunity.223
Those same concerns for the improper delegation of the federal
government’s power to sue are also evidenced in the Fifth Circuit’s separation
of powers analysis in Riley.224 Article II of the Constitution vests the executive
power in the President.225 That Article also requires the President to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”226 The power of the Executive has
been found to be unitary, that is, not subject to distribution among the other
two branches of government.227 Article II’s Appointments Clause provides the
President with the authority to execute the laws by vesting the President with
the exclusive power to select the primary officers of the federal government,
with the Senate’s consent.228 The Court has held that the Appointments Clause
covers any government agent exercising significant authority under federal
law.229 Taken together these three clauses work in unison in our constitutional
structure to vest enforcement of the laws exclusively with the President and his
or her appointed officers, subject to the President’s control. In this context
James Madison noted “I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to
diminish or modify his executive authority.”230 In Morrison v. Olson, the
Court noted that anyone who exercises the executive authority must be subject
to at least some reasonable control by the President or his or her agents.231
These same Article II clauses also form the basis for the limited waiver of
sovereign immunity that the states consented to during the constitutional
convention, allowing suit by those in the federal government under a
constitutional duty to execute the laws.
Morrison involved a separation of powers challenge to the independent
counsel statute. The Court in that case considered whether the statute
222. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (1999). (“Suits brought by the United States itself
require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control
which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.”).
223. Long, 173 F.3d at 883.
224. See Riley, 196 F.3d at 531.
225. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (the “Vesting Clause”).
226. Id. § 3 (the “Take Care Clause”).
227. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (indicating that the Framers
intended for unity in the Executive Branch to “insure both vigor and accountability”).
228. U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2.
229. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
230. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
231. 487 U.S. 654, 684 (1988).
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impermissibly “reduce[d] the amount of control or supervision that the
Attorney General and, through him, the President exercise[d] over the
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of . . . criminal activity.”232
Affirming the constitutional diminution of the President’s removal authority,
the Court noted that the Attorney General could remove the independent
counsel for misconduct or good cause.233 Morrison makes clear that the
President must still retain ultimate authority over the faithful execution of the
laws. The apparent and perhaps fundamental flaw in the FCA is that it entrusts
the initiation and prosecution of the laws to a private party and neither the
President nor his lawful delegates can remove the relator, or limit his
arguments or strategy in any way.234 This is the case whether or not the
government joins in the action. Only the court is allowed to silence a
relator.235 Additionally, the relator can frustrate the Executive’s efforts to
settle a case by objecting to that settlement, even when such objection only
serves the relator’s interests.236 In some instances, such objections can take a
year to resolve.237 Morrison forbids such an intrusion on the Executive’s
authority. These concerns are especially problematic when such interference
with Executive authority breaches the promise made to the states during the
constitutional convention that only those vested with the constitutional duty to
execute the laws could bring an unconsented to suit against them.
The court in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak238 doubted whether the
federal government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity could be
delegated. The Blatchford court found that “[t]he consent, ‘inherent in the
convention,’ to suit by the United States . . . is not consent to suit by anyone
whom the United States might select . . . .”239 The Stevens court distinguished
Blatchford by explaining that the plaintiffs in Blatchford were Native
American tribes which brought suit against Alaska to remedy injuries the
tribes, not the federal government, sustained.240 The Blatchford plaintiffs
believed that their suit against the State was proper “because the United States

232. Id. at 695.
233. Id. at 692.
234. But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000), where
the majority was unconcerned by the Executive’s lack of control over private plaintiffs. In his
dissent Justice Scalia strongly disagreed and argued that “permitting citizens to pursue civil
penalties payable to the Federal Treasury . . . turns over to private citizens the function of
enforcing the law.” Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2)(C).
236. Id. § 3730 (c) (2) (B).
237. United State ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 166,
169 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
238. 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991).
239. Id. at 785.
240. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 203.
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is empowered to bring suit for the benefit of the tribes.”241 The Stevens court
further noted that the relator sues on behalf of the United States in a qui tam
action under the FCA for injuries sustained by the United States, and not for
injuries sustained by the private relator.242 Accordingly, using the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Stevens, there is no need to delegate the federal
government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity because the federal
government is still the real party in interest. But this position ignores the
Morrison and Riley separation of powers concerns noted above.
VII. WHO CAN CLAIM ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY?
If the courts conclude that Congress intended states, municipalities and
their agencies to be included within the meaning of “person” for purposes of
the Act, a cause of action against those entities for submitting false claims will
be recognized. If, however, it is adjudged that the federal government is not
the real party in interest in a qui tam action in which it does not intervene, or
that the United States government is unable to delegate its Eleventh
Amendment immunity exemption to a qui tam relator, the courts will
nevertheless be left with the question of which entities have the privilege of
claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court has already
found that a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits against states by
private plaintiffs in both federal and state courts.243 Moreover, “[s]uits against
state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the
individual’s office, and so are generally barred as suits against the State
itself.”244
The situations and circumstances in which a state agency may claim
Eleventh Amendment immunity have also been fairly clearly prescribed. A
state agency may claim Eleventh Amendment immunity when the suit brought
against it is considered to be, in fact, a suit against the state itself. This
determination is based on whether the judgment sought in the suit would
actually be satisfied by the public fisc rather than agency funds:
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the ‘judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the
public administration,’ or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the
Government from acting, or to compel it to act.’245

241. See id.
242. See id. at 202.
243. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255-56.
244. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Will, 491
U.S. at 71).
245. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102 n.11 (1984) (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620
(1963)). See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“It is also well established that
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There is, however, an exception to this general rule. When an action is brought
against a state agency that is a separate entity, generating its own profits and
responsible for its own debts, the action will not be considered one against the
state, and the Eleventh Amendment will not bar the suit.246
In Zissler, although the issue on appeal to the Eighth Circuit was whether
or not states and state agencies fell within the FCA’s meaning of “person,” the
court also addressed whether the defendant State university was entitled to
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in any situation in which the
State itself could claim such immunity.247 In holding that states and state
agencies were “persons” for purposes of the Act, the court also stated: “We
agree with the University that it is an instrumentality of the State and is entitled
to whatever immunities or defenses the State would have if sued in its own
name.”248 It is, however, important to remember that when courts find that the
United States is the real party in interest, as the Eighth Circuit did in Zissler,
the state will be unable to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit
and, therefore, the state agency will also be precluded from raising the
defense.249
The question of whether a municipality or one of its agencies can claim
Eleventh Amendment immunity has been answered in the negative in Alden.
The Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity bars suits against states
but not lesser entities, because “[t]he immunity does not extend to suits
prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which
is not an arm of the State.”250 Since Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be
claimed by a county or municipal corporation,251 the issue of whether an
agency can claim Eleventh Amendment immunity depends upon whether the
courts treat the agency “as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or
other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not
extend.”252 In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, however, the Supreme Court addressed the issue by determining that

even though a State is not a named party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.”).
246. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994).
247. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871.
248. See id. at 871 n.2.
249. Id. at 872. See also Rodgers, 154 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a state has no
Eleventh Amendment immunity against a qui tam relator even when the government does not
intervene).
250. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
251. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
252. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
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“local government units . . . are not considered part of the State for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.”253
VIII. DOES A PRIVATE PLAINTIFF HAVE STANDING TO SUE WHEN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTERVENE?
As previously noted, shortly before oral argument, the Court in Stevens
requested briefing on the Article III standing of a relator under the FCA.
Presumably, the request for supplemental briefing on an issue not raised in the
proceedings below was premised upon the Court’s holding in Calderon v.
Ashmus,254 in which the Court stated that standing must be established before
considering the merits of any Eleventh Amendment challenge.255 In Calderon,
the Court raised the standing issue sua sponte. In Stevens, as noted earlier, the
Court can dispose of the case by deciding that states are not “persons” under
the FCA without addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue. Nonetheless, by
requiring briefing on the standing issue, the Court cleared the way to address
standing, albeit with rather slim profferings by the parties in the dispute.
Hopefully, the Court will allow relator standing to be addressed in another case
wherein the issue is briefed and addressed in the lower courts and in the main
briefs before the reviewing Court. This section briefly identifies the key
considerations surrounding relator standing, but the issue should be addressed
more authoritatively on another occasion.
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal court jurisdiction
extends only to cases and controversies.256 In Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,257 the Court described the three elements necessary to establish
Article III standing:
1.

Plaintiff must have suffered and “injury in fact” which is “actual or
imminent” and must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way;”

2.

Plaintiff’s alleged injury must be directly related to the defendant’s
conduct; and

3.

Plaintiff’s alleged injury must be redressible by the requested
relief.258

Therefore, in order for a private plaintiff to maintain an action in federal
court, that plaintiff must be able to meet these three elements of standing. In a

253.
(1978).
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.54
533 U.S. 740 (1998).
Id. at 745.
U.S. CONST. art 3, § 2.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
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qui tam action under the FCA the private plaintiff has not suffered a personal
injury-in-fact but is merely suing on behalf of the federal government or the
public at large for injuries suffered due to the alleged false claims made by the
defendant. While it is true that “Congress can . . . enact statutes creating new
substantive legal rights, the invasion of which can give rise to the kind of
particularized injury necessary to create standing[,]”259 the plaintiff must still
have suffered an actual personal injury which can be redressed by the
requested relief. In other words, “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would
not otherwise have standing [to sue].”260
The lower court in Riley dismissed the qui tam relator’s case, holding that
the relator had not established Article III standing because she lacked an
injury-in-fact.261 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal on different grounds and stated that it was precluded from addressing
the relator’s Article III standing by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Foulds,262
which held that an uninjured qui tam plaintiff may have standing even if the
government does not intervene.263 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Riley
reluctantly concluded that its qui tam relator could have Article III standing.264
Since the Foulds court’s limited discussion regarding standing was placed in a
footnote, and was raised sua sponte without briefing from the parties,265 the
concurrence in Riley argued that the Foulds court’s discussion of standing was
only dicta and, therefore, was not controlling.266 However, while the majority
in Riley characterized the conclusion in Foulds as “no more than a passing
reference in a brief footnote,”267 it nonetheless held that the language was not
dicta and was binding because standing is a justiciability issue that must be
resolved before a court can adjudicate any remaining issues in a case.268
The Foulds analysis remains questionable because the only authorities the
Fifth Circuit relied upon were a pre-Lujan decision269 and a Supreme Court
259. Riley, 196 F.3d at 539 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973)).
260. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)).
261. United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 1261, 1268 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
262. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
263. See Riley, 196 F.3d at 521.
264. Since this decision created a Circuit split, the court ordered “that this cause [of action]
shall be reheard by the court en banc with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed.” Riley,
196 F.3d at 563.
265. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 288 n.12.
266. See Riley, 196 F.3d at 536 (DeMoss, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 521.
268. Id. at 522.
269. See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977).
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decision which adjudicated an FCA suit without specifically addressing the
standing issue because there was no objection to the qui tam relator’s
standing.270 The fact that the Court requested additional briefing on the
standing issue in Stevens shortly after publication of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Riley suggests that the Supreme Court is concerned about the issue
and is looking for a vehicle to address those standing concerns created by qui
tam actions under the FCA.
IX. CONCLUSION
The courts remain split on whether states are “persons” under the FCA and
whether a qui tam relator may maintain an action against a state, county, or
governmental agency. But the trend in the Circuits has been towards allowing
such suits. There have been only two truly significant decisions holding the
opposite, those being the D.C. Circuit in Long and the Fifth Circuit in
Foulds.271 While only the D.C. Circuit case addressed the issue of whether
“person,” as used in the Act, is broad enough to include states, both courts
suggest that when the federal government fails to intervene in a qui tam action
the Eleventh Amendment bars the relator from suing a state or state agency.
One or both of these issues will be resolved by the Supreme Court in Stevens.
The Court’s treatment of similar concerns during 1999 suggests that it will lean
toward using the Eleventh Amendment to protect the state fisc, especially
where, as here, the federal government has alternative remedies to make itself
whole.272 However, the Court may choose to limit itself to the statutory issue
by deciding that states are not “persons” under the FCA.273 Such a holding
would eliminate the need to address the more difficult Eleventh Amendment
concerns.

270. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
271. Long, 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Foulds, 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
272. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (civil monetary penalty
provisions); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885(d) (1998) (reopening of determinations or decisions procured
by fraud); and 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1994) (audit process provisions).
273. Although such a holding would bar suits brought by the federal government as well as
suits brought by qui tam relators.

